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APPENDIX N

HOW WIDE THE

~TERRITORIAL

SEA?*

I. The Background and the Vote-1960 Conference
By
Captain ROBERT D. POWERS, JR., U.S. Navy
and
Captain LEONARD R. HARDY, U.S. Navy
At 10 :30 on the morning of 26 April 1960, an atmosphere of the
utmost tension prevailed in the Palais des Nations in Geneva. For
the third time, representatives of the nations of the world were voting
on proposals to fix the breadth of the territorial sea. As the voting
ended, a hush fell over the Assembly Hall and then the President of
the Conference announced the vote on the U.S.-Canadian proposal
which had been adopted in Committee. The vote stood 54 for the
proposal, 28 against, with five abstentions. For the third time since
1930 the representatives of the nations of the world were unable to
reach agreement on the width of the marginal sea; this time by a
margin of one vote.
During the 1958 Geneva Convention on the law of the sea it became
apparent that the customary 3-mile limit for the width of the territorial sea was unacceptable to many nations of the world. At the end
of the Conference it was evident that although the United States
and other maritime nations maintained that three miles continued to
be the limit in the absence of an international convention, the real contest at the 1960 Conference on the territorial sea and fisheries would
be between proponents of a 6-mile limit and a 12-mile limit. At the
1958 convention, Dr. Bocobo, the Philippine delegate, wittily lamented the death of Mr. Three-Miles, -vvho had served the international community so "\Veil and so long, and said that his heirs, Mr. SixMiles and Mr. Twelve-Miles, were quarreling over his estate.
Unable to reach agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea and
the limits of fisheries control, the 1958 Conference postponed the arguInent for a later conference, and proceeded to adopt conventions on
the freedom of the High Seas, Fishing and Conservation n1atters, the
*Reprinted by permission from Proceedings; Copyright© 1961 by U.S. Naval
Institute.
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Continental Shelf, and the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
(without fixing territorial sea or fishery limits). The conventions
adopted were of great importance and constitute a signal advance in
the codification of the international law of the sea.**
The General Assembly of the United Nations, at its thirteenth
session decided that a second international conference "should be
called for the purpose of considering further the questions of the
breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits," and the Secretary
General of the United Nations set 17 March 1960, as the date for the
convening at Geneva of this second conference on the law of the sea.
The diversity of claims and the differences in ideology and economics had been shown by the positions taken at the 1958 conference.
At the opening of that conference, 21 nations claimed a 3-mile marginal sea, 17 nations clailned four to six miles, 13 claimed seven to 12
miles, and nine nations claimed the sea above the continental shelf,
some of these to a distance of 200 miles.
The 3-mile limit, as a rule of international law, was based upon the
customs and practices of the more powerful maritime nations and
was first proposed in 1703 by the legal writer, Bynkershoeck. It asserted that the extent of a nation's dominion over the sea was measured
by its ability to control from land, and that the test of this ability
'vas the range of cannon which was then about three nautical miles.
During the 18th and 19th centuries and the first quarter of the 20th
century, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and other
naval powers accepted three miles as the limit of the territorial sea.
Some nations claimed four or six miles and Russia claimed 12, yet in
practice and in books on international law, three miles 'vas the_widest
breadth that had general acceptance.
During the period of the development of the 3-mile limit, many
of the now independent members of the United Nations were colonies
or dependencies of the larger powers. Many others were undeveloped.
These nations, proud of their sovereignty and jealous of anything that
smacks of "colonialism," desire to extend the limits of their legal control as far as possible. Many of them have small navies and a little
merchant marine and the freedom of the high seas is theoretical and
of small practical value to them. On the other hand they want to
prevent stronger nations from approaching their shores and catching
the fish swimming in adjacent waters.
The first documentation of the diversity in claims to the territorial
sea was made at the 1930 Hague Conference for the Codification of
International Law. There three miles was acknowledged as a mini·**See Professional Note, "The Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea,"
U.S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS, A.pril1960, page 133.
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n1um but there was no agreement as to the maximum. Seventeen
nations claimed a 3-mile limit, 17 nations favored a four to 6-mile
li1nit, and one nation favored a 12-mile limit, 'vhile the U.S.S.R. confined itself to this statement, "Use of international maritime water'vays must under no conditions be interfered with."
ANGLO-AMERICAN COMPROMISE REJECTED

At the 1958 conference, the United States and Great Britain, hoping
to obtain agreement by compromise, offered a proposal for a 6-mile
lilnit, with an additional 6-mile zone of fishing control, with preservation of historic rights for nations whose nationals had engaged in
fishing within 12 miles of another nation for five years or more. This
proposal was generally accepted as a sincere effort to secure agreement
and stop the scramble of many nations to restrict the freedom of the
high seas. It secured 45 votes for, to 33 against, but did not secure
the two-thirds majority necessary for adoption. The Soviet proposal
that each state could establish its own territorial sea within the limits,
as a rule, of three to 12 miles was rejected by a vote of 21 for, to 47
against.
During the two years between conferences, preparations for the
showdown at the 1960 conference Vi.rere made by many nations. The
United States, firmly convinced that six miles was the outer lin1it
consistent 'vith security and the limitations of neutrality patrol, and
fortified by the support for its compromise proposal at the 1958 conference, had its representatives from the Navy and fro1n the DepartInent of State visit nations all over the world to secure support for the
6-mile limit with six more miles of fishing control.
"\Vhile the United States preferred a retention of a 3-mile limit for
the marginal sea, analysis of the voting at the 1958 convention revealed that such a limit had no reasonable chance of approval at an international convention. The Soviet Union and its satellites could
not be expected to vote for any limit less than 12 miles. Their aim
'vas to try to reduce the effectiveness of the sea power of the free world
nations by an extension of sovereignty into the high seas, which in
addition to removing a vast area from the free high seas would convert all important international straits into territorial waters. The
n1obility of free world navies and merchant ships is one of the greatest
restraints to the announced campaign of the Soviets for world
domination.
The Arab states, emotionally· opposed to Israel and hoping to close
the Gulf of Aqaba and prevent commerce from reaching the Israeli
port of Elath by sea, also were expected to support a 12-mile limit.
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Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile all indicated a tendency to support
a minimum zone of 12 miles, primarily to protect fishing.
A total of 22 to 24 states of the United Nations were therefore expected to support a 12-mile limit, while slightly more than two-thirds
of the states appeared from their voting record to be willing to accept
six miles as the width of the marginal sea, but the problem of getting
them to do so involved consideration of the limits of fisheries control.
The last conference indicated that there was broad disagreement on
this issue, but practically all of the states willing to accept a 6-mile
limit had voted either for the U.S. or for the Canadian proposal. The
single difference between these proposals was iri the control of fisheries
in the 6-mile fishing control zone adjoining the 6-mile territorial sea.
The U. S. proposal would have preserved the historic rights of other
nations to fish in the area of the second 6-mile marginal zone forever,
and the Canadian proposal would have abolished such rights
immediately.
Fishing rights were therefore an important item at the 1960 conference, for to many countries they are extensive and economically
important. Nationals of some countries have fished to ·within three
1niles of the coasts of other countries for hundreds of years. Immediate loss of this right to fish would have resulted in severe economic
dislocation and hardship to the nationals of many countries, among
them the United States and several western European nations. Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, and a few smaller states had extensive foreign fishing off their coasts and wanted it stopped, though
Denmark and Norway wished to continue to fish off the coasts of other
nations.
When the conference met, with 88 nations participating, 24 ·were
aligned with the Soviet bloc favoring a 12-mile limit, about 20 nations
wished control over a wide zone for fishing, and the remaining 44 nations were relatively unaffected by the fishing problem and inclined
toward a narrow belt of territorial sea. It appeared that if the fishing problem could be solved, more than the two-thirds required majority would accept a narrow limit of territorial waters as essential
to the security of the free nations of the world.
The United States accordingly sought a formula which would be
a combination of the U.S. and Canadian proposals at the 1958 conference. While the United States still favored a belt of three miles,
it ·was obviously impractical to start with such a proposal. The goal
'vas to gain acceptance of a 6-mile limit, as it was the opinion of our
1nilitary experts that the Soviet formula, permitting a zone of from
3-. to 12-miles at the option of the littoral state would be just as damag-
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ing in effect to the security of the Free World as an absolute 12-mile
zone.
Pre-conference discussions with some 40 nations had shown that a
marginal sea of six miles, plus six more miles of fishing control subject to historic rights, had poor prospects for acceptance for many
reasons, among them that Canada and other countries affected by
foreign fishing would not accept perpetual preservation of historic
fishing rights, and some of the newer nations of the world regarded
such preservation as a vestige of colonialism.
·
Discussion with the states engaged in foreign fishing indicated that
they would not accept the 1958 Canadian proposal. The United
States then discussed with Canada and the foreign fishing states a
proposal which would include a 6-mile territorial sea and a 6-mile
contiguous zone :for fishil\g control in which foreign fishing would
continue at the level of the 5-year base period for a term of years to
be determined at the Conference and then be terminated. Though
pre-conference probings indicated that fishing nations were opposed
to this, it appeared to be a reasonable method of allovving a. satisfactory period for amortization of funds invested in fishing vessels
and equipment.
At the conference, the U.S.S.R. filed a proposal for a permissive
3- to 12-mile zone of territorial waters, with provision that any state
announcing less than a 12-mile zone could add the remaining area up
to 12 miles as a fishing control zone. Mexico filed a proposal for a
3- to 12-mile zone, but providing for a bonus if the territorial sea was
kept narrow. A nation claiming up to six miles would have a total
of 18 miles for fishing control, one claiming 6 to 9 miles would get
six additional miles for fishing control, and nations claiming 12 miles
would get no additional zone :for fishing.
Canada submitted the same six plus six miles as at the 1958 conference and the United States proposed the six plus six miles with
preservation of historic rights maintained at the same level of fishing
as during the 5-year base period.
SOVIET BLOC CALLS 6-MILE LIMIT POLITICAL

The supporters of the 12-mile proposals lined up solidly and it appeared that they might be able to get a majority vote in committee.
To complicate matters, delegate Sen from India made an impassioned
plea in an opening speech for adoption of a rule that would keep
warships away from the coasts of small nations. The Soviet bloc
of nations seized upon this and each strongly attacked the 6-mile
limit on the basis that the large maritime powers wanted a narrow
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belt of marginal sea in order to permit the1n to use their large navies
to coerce small nations in political1natters.
The United States and the nations supporting a 6-mile limit stressed the importance of a narro·w territorial sea as a means of preventing i1npair1nent of freedo1n of navigation. The 12-milers countered
that the right o:£ innocent passage was an answer to this argument,
but Norway's representative stated that his country, as a small nation
with a large merchant 1narine, knevv from experience that the right of
innocent passage will not protect 1nerchant ships from harassment
and interference through regulations and special controls.
Representatives of the Soviet bloc repeatedly stated that any li1nit
less than 12Iniles was unrealistic and that the United States and other
nations should "compromise" by accepting this limit. Delegate
Drew of Canada in reply to this argument stated that while there was
plenty of evidence of conciliation and compromise on the part of the
3- and 6-mile nations there has been no sign of any proclivity to comproinise by those supporting a 12-Inile li1nit.
On 8 April, Canada and the United States having 1nerged their
proposals, 1\fr. Dean of the United States and Mr. Drew of Canada
jointly introduced for their countries a proposal for a 6-mile marginal
sea plus six additional miles for fishery control, with "historic fishing"
to continue for ten years from 31 October 1961. This joint proposal,
with withdrawal of the previous Canadian and U.S. proposal, appeared to be well received by a large number of delegations.

MEXICO'S ROLE TO PREVENT AGREEMENT
Nevertheless, the hard -core 12-Inilers, led by Garcia Robles of
Mexico, were openly deter1nined to prevent conference agree1nent on
any compromise proposal whatever, and took advantage of every possible parliamentary 1naneuver to prevent the joint U.S.-Canadian proposal from securing the necessary two-thirds majority.
In Committee, 18 nations from Africa, Asia, and South America
introduced a proposal substantially the same as the Soviet proposal,
and the U.S.S.R. and Mexico then withdrew their proposal. Thus
only two principal proposals, the optional 3- to 12-Inile liinit and the
U.S.-Canadian proposal of six 1niles plus six 1nore miles for fishing
control were voted upon on 13 April 1960. The 18-power proposal
was defeated 36 for, and 39 against, with 13 abstentions. The U.S.Canadian proposal was adopted by the committee by a vote of 43 for,
33 against, and 12 abstentions.
The co1n1nittee therefore reco1nmended to the conference adoption of
the U.S.-Canadian proposal with a 1ninor amendment which was designed to recognize Iceland's special case, but this amendment \vas
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rejected in the later voting. In the plenary session, Mexico introduced
a proposal that the conference agree that it could not agree and refer
the matter back to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This
was defeated. Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay proposed authorization of
arbitration commissions to hear and determine the validity of claims of
a coastal state to preferential rights outside the territorial sea and
contiguous zone, which was adopted as an amendm·ent to the U.S.Canadian proposal.
Peru and Cuba proposed provisions for preferential treatment for
a coastal state. Ghana offered a provision to require advance notificat ion for the passage of warships through the territorial sea and the
contiguous zone. These proposals were ,either withdrawn or rejected.
A proposal was offered by Ghana, Liberia, and Ethiopia, urging that
the United Nations give technical aid on fishing to undeveloped nat ions proved to be non-controversial, and this was adopted by 68 votes
for, none against and 20 abstentions.
The main debate therefore eentered on the U.S.-Canadian proposal,
but no matters of great interest were discussed, indicating that the nations were fairly well decided on how they would vote. The U.S.S.R.
criticized the United States for trying to get votes for its proposal, and
finally the Soviets and Saudi Arabia announced that even if there "\Yas
agreement on a 6-plus-6-mile zone, they and some other nations 'voulcl
not accept such a zone.
Immediately after the proposal was defeated (because it had received 54 votes when 55 were needed for the two-thirds majority required for adoption) the United States moved for reconsideration, but
this motion was defeated.
The voting tally on the U.S.-Canadian proposal was as follows:
FOR : 54
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Cameroons
Canada
C,eylon
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Denmark

Dominican Rep.
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Holy See
Honduras
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jordan
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l(orea
Laos
Liberia
Luxembourg
Malaya
Monaco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nor··way
Pakistan
Paraguay
Portugal
San Marino
Spain
Sweden
S wi tz·erland
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Union o:f So. A:frica
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Vietnam
AGAINST: 28
Albania
Bulgaria
Burma
Byelorussia

Chile
Czechslovakia
Ecuador
Guinea
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Libya
Mexico
Morocco
Panama
Peru
Poland
Ro1nania
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Ukrainian S.S.R.
U.S.S.R.
United Arab Republic
Venezuela
Yemen
Yugoslavia
ABSTAIN: 5
Cambodia
El Salvador
Iran
Japan
Philippines

Thereupon Mr. Dean made a statement that the United States had
again offered a compromise to fix the breadth o:f the territorial sea
which had :failed o:f adoption by one vote. Since this compromise had
been rejected, he said that the United States adhered to its traditional
position that the customary 3-mile limit is the only breadth o:f the
marginal sea sanctioned by international law.
The conference adjourned without agreement on the width o:f the
territorial sea, and varying claims as to its extent by different nations
will continue. It does appear that the nations who seek a li1nit o:f 12
or more miles have lost strength while the proponents o:f not n1ore than
six miles have gained. The 12-milers ·weakened their position by announcing in advance that they would not accept a 6-mile limit were it
adopted by two-thirds o:f the nations o:f the world. Agreement by the
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representatives of 54 nations on a 6-mile zone plus six miles for fishing
control will have a very significant effect on the future development
of international law in this area, whether it be by court interpretation,
custom, or a later treaty or action by the General Assembly of the
United Nations.
Meanwhile the United States is free to acknowledge only the customary three miles as the limit of the territorial sea.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961

